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Lesson M17.L05: Medium-Run Equilibrium and Policy Stabilisation

Module: From Short to Medium Run: The IS-LM-PC Model Level: intermediate Duration: 30 minutes Learning Objective: Characterise the medium-run equilibrium in the IS-LM-PC model where output equals potential and inflation is stable. Data as of: 2024 Provenance: RBA Inflation Targeting | MIT OCW 14.02

Explanation

The medium-run equilibrium is the economy's resting point after all short-run adjustments have played out. In the IS-LM-PC framework, it is defined by three simultaneous conditions:

Medium-Run Equilibrium Conditions:

(1) Y = Yโ‚™           (output equals potential โ€” zero output gap)
(2) ฯ€ = ฯ€แต‰ = ฯ€*      (inflation equals expectations equals target)
(3) i = i_neutral     (nominal rate at the neutral level)

Neutral nominal interest rate:

i_neutral = r* + ฯ€*
Where r is the neutral real rate (consistent with Y = Yโ‚™ when inflation is at target) and ฯ€ is the inflation target.

Notation: - All variables as in previous lessons - r = neutral real interest rate (Australia: historically ~2.5% per M17.L04; revised down to ~0.75โ€“1.0% post-COVID as global r fell โ€” this lesson uses the post-COVID estimate for the current equilibrium) - i_neutral = nominal neutral rate (Australia: approximately 3.0โ€“3.5% post-COVID)

Why is this a stable equilibrium?

  1. If Y > Yโ‚™: PC shows ฯ€ > ฯ€แต‰ โ†’ expectations rise โ†’ CB tightens โ†’ Y falls back toward Yโ‚™
  2. If Y < Yโ‚™: PC shows ฯ€ < ฯ€แต‰ โ†’ expectations fall โ†’ CB eases โ†’ Y rises back toward Yโ‚™
  3. If ฯ€ > ฯ€: CB raises i above i_neutral โ†’ aggregate demand falls โ†’ gap closes โ†’ ฯ€ returns to ฯ€*

The economy converges to medium-run equilibrium IF two conditions hold: - The central bank credibly commits to ฯ€ - Inflation expectations are anchored (do not drift permanently away from ฯ€)

Barro-Gordon intuition (time inconsistency): Without commitment, a CB has an incentive to create surprise inflation to boost output above Yโ‚™. Rational agents anticipate this โ†’ ฯ€แต‰ rises โ†’ CB must deliver higher inflation to keep its "promise" โ†’ inflation escalates without output gain. The solution: institutional commitment to a target (e.g., the RBA's legislative mandate and Statement on the Conduct of Monetary Policy, in place since 1993).

RBA inflation targeting (1993โ€“present): Australia adopted formal inflation targeting in 1993. The 2โ€“3% target band has been in place since. The 2022โ€“23 episode was the first serious test of credibility since the 1990s recession. Long-run inflation expectations (5-year ahead market-implied) remained close to 2.5โ€“3% throughout the inflation surge, suggesting the RBA's credibility was largely maintained.

Medium-run vs. long-run: In the IS-LM-PC framework, the "medium run" assumes Yโ‚™ is fixed. In the very long run (growth models), Yโ‚™ itself grows via capital accumulation and technological progress โ€” the subject of Module M18.

Worked Example

Setup: Economy is initially at medium-run equilibrium. Then a fiscal stimulus (G increases) creates a demand shock in period 1.

Initial equilibrium (period 0):

Yโ‚€ = Yโ‚™ = 100, ฯ€โ‚€ = ฯ€แต‰โ‚€ = ฯ€* = 2.5%, iโ‚€ = r* + ฯ€* = 1.0% + 2.5% = 3.5%

Period 1 (demand shock):

Gโ†‘ โ†’ IS shifts right โ†’ Yโ‚ = 103, gapโ‚ = +3%
ฯ€โ‚ = ฯ€แต‰โ‚ + ฮฒ ร— gapโ‚ = 2.5% + 0.5 ร— 3% = 4.0%
CB raises i above 3.5% to cool demand

Period 2 (CB response, partial gap closure):

CB raises iโ‚‚ = 5.0% โ†’ Yโ‚‚ = 101, gapโ‚‚ = +1%
ฯ€แต‰โ‚‚ = ฯ€โ‚ = 4.0%  (adaptive)
ฯ€โ‚‚ = 4.0% + 0.5 ร— 1% = 4.5%

Period 3 (gap closes, but inflation elevated):

CB holds iโ‚ƒ = 5.0% or higher โ†’ Yโ‚ƒ = 100 = Yโ‚™, gapโ‚ƒ = 0%
ฯ€แต‰โ‚ƒ = ฯ€โ‚‚ = 4.5%
ฯ€โ‚ƒ = 4.5% + 0 = 4.5%

The new "stuck" equilibrium: Y = Yโ‚™ but ฯ€ = 4.5% โ‰  ฯ€ = 2.5%. This is NOT medium-run equilibrium because ฯ€ โ‰  ฯ€. To complete the return:

Period 4 (active disinflation โ€” CB must create negative gap):

CB raises i above i_neutral, pushing Y below Yโ‚™. Require: ฯ€โ‚„ = ฯ€* = 2.5%. If ฯ€แต‰โ‚„ = 4.5%:

2.5% = 4.5% + 0.5 ร— gapโ‚„
0.5 ร— gapโ‚„ = 2.5% โˆ’ 4.5% = โˆ’2.0%
gapโ‚„ = โˆ’4%   โ†’ Yโ‚„ = 96

Period 5 (medium-run equilibrium restored):

Once ฯ€โ‚„ = 2.5%, ฯ€แต‰โ‚… = 2.5%, and CB can reduce i back to i_neutral = 3.5%, Y returns to 100.

Yโ‚… = 100, ฯ€โ‚… = ฯ€แต‰โ‚… = ฯ€* = 2.5%, iโ‚… = 3.5% = r* + ฯ€*
Medium-run equilibrium is restored. The path required a painful period of Y < Yโ‚™ to wring out the elevated inflation expectations built up during the adjustment.

Common Misconception

Misconception: "Medium-run equilibrium means the economy never changes โ€” it's a long-run steady state."

Correction: Medium-run equilibrium in the IS-LM-PC model is a conditional resting point, not a permanent state. It holds Yโ‚™, r, and the structure of the economy fixed. In reality, Yโ‚™ grows over time (via capital, labour, and technology โ€” the subject of growth theory). Structural shocks can shift r (e.g., the post-GFC "secular stagnation" lowered r* globally; COVID further compressed it). The medium-run equilibrium is the gravitational centre toward which short-run fluctuations are pulled, given a fixed structure โ€” but that structure itself evolves.

Practice Prompts

  1. Conceptual: What are the two necessary conditions for the IS-LM-PC model to converge to medium-run equilibrium, and what historical examples show each condition failing? โ†’ Answer: Condition 1 โ€” Central bank commits credibly to ฯ€. Failure: the 1970s, when many central banks (including the RBA's predecessor) accommodated supply shocks, allowing ฯ€แต‰ to drift upward. Result: stagflation, inflation entrenched at 10%+. Condition 2 โ€” Inflation expectations anchor at ฯ€. Failure: hyperinflation episodes (e.g., 1920s Germany, Zimbabwe 2000s) where ฯ€แต‰ became de-anchored and self-reinforcing. Convergence to medium-run equilibrium requires both institutional commitment and rational/adaptive expectations that respond to credible policy.

  2. Numerical: Given r = 1.0%, ฯ€ = 2.5%, compute i_neutral. Then, if actual ฯ€ = 4.0% and gap = +2%, calculate the Taylor rule prescribed rate (ฮฑ_ฯ€ = ฮฑ_Y = 0.5) and the gap between it and i_neutral. โ†’ Answer:
    i_neutral = r + ฯ€ = 1.0% + 2.5% = 3.5%
    Taylor rule: i = r + ฯ€ + 0.5(ฯ€ โˆ’ ฯ€) + 0.5 ร— gap
    i = 1.0 + 4.0 + 0.5(4.0 โˆ’ 2.5) + 0.5 ร— 2.0
    i = 1.0 + 4.0 + 0.75 + 1.0 = 6.75%
    Gap above neutral = 6.75% โˆ’ 3.5% = 3.25 pp
    The CB must hold rates 3.25 pp above the neutral rate to stabilise the economy. This corresponds to a contractionary stance until inflation returns to target and the output gap closes.

  3. Application: The RBA's Statement on the Conduct of Monetary Policy establishes the 2โ€“3% target band and emphasises that "on average, over time" inflation should be within the band. How does this forward-looking formulation support convergence to medium-run equilibrium? โ†’ Answer: The "on average, over time" formulation gives the RBA flexibility to temporarily allow inflation outside the band (e.g., due to supply shocks) without sacrificing long-run credibility. This is consistent with the Barro-Gordon insight: as long as agents believe the CB will eventually return inflation to target, ฯ€แต‰ stays anchored near 2.5%. Anchored expectations flatten the adjustment path โ€” small output gaps suffice to return inflation to target. If the CB instead committed to hitting 2.5% every period, it would have to create large output gaps in response to every supply shock, producing excessive volatility.

Further Resources